Three Years of War in Ukraine: Are Sanctions Against Russia Making a Difference?

In Brief

Three Years of War in Ukraine: Are Sanctions Against Russia Making a Difference?

The United States and its allies have imposed broad economic penalties on Russia over its war in Ukraine. As the conflict continues, experts debate whether the sanctions are working.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the United States has implemented a broad sweep of sanctions focused on isolating Russia from the global financial system, reducing the profitability of its energy sector, and blunting its military edge. These added to a bevy of sanctions that the United States imposed on Russia after it annexed the Ukrainian region of Crimea in 2014. The reelection of U.S. President Donald Trump injected uncertainty into the future of U.S. support for Ukraine, but his administration has not lifted or relaxed the sanctions regime against Russia implemented under President Joe Biden. As the United States pushes for ceasefire talks, Trump has raised the prospect of ratcheting up sanctions pressure in order to bring Russia to the negotiating table.

What sanctions has the United States imposed against Russia over the war in Ukraine?

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The latest sanctions have targeted Russia’s: 

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Financial sector. The United States began its 2022 barrage of sanctions by freezing $5 billion of the Russian central bank’s U.S. assets, an unprecedented move to prevent Moscow from using its foreign reserves to prop up the Russian ruble. It also barred the largest Russian bank and several others from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), a Belgium-based interbank messaging service critical to processing international payments. The U.S. Treasury Department prohibited U.S. investors from trading Russian securities, including debt; all together, the sanctions restrict dealings with 80 percent of Russian banking sector assets. Washington has also sought to seize the U.S. assets of sanctioned Russian individuals, including President Vladimir Putin

Energy. The United States has also focused on reducing Russia’s ability to profit from the global sale of fossil fuels. The year before the war, Russia recorded more than $240 billion in energy exports, almost half of which came from oil. In March 2022, Washington banned the import of Russian crude oil, liquified natural gas, and coal, and restricted U.S. investments in most Russian energy companies. In December of that year, the United States and its Group of Seven (G7) allies implemented rules aimed at capping the price that other importing countries, such as China and India, would pay for Russian crude oil. In 2024, the United States barred imports of Russian enriched uranium, cutting off a major source of revenue for Russia. However, certain U.S. companies are able to apply for waivers until 2028 to circumvent the ban.

Military tech. The U.S. Commerce Department has curbed exports of high-tech products such as aircraft equipment and semiconductors to Russia with the aim of curtailing its military capabilities. The export restrictions extend to goods other countries produce using American technology.

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Miscellaneous sectors. In January 2024, the United States and G7 imposed sanctions on Russian diamonds, one of the largest unsanctioned Russian exports at the time. Moscow recorded almost $4 billion in diamond revenue in 2022, with G7 countries accounting for about 70 percent of sales. The United States also sanctioned companies around the world, including in China, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, that it said have helped Russia evade sanctions.

People walk past a branch of Russian VTB bank in Moscow on April 5, 2023. - Russia's second-largest bank, VTB, reported a huge loss amounting to $7.7 billion in 2022 after it was hit hard by Western sanctions over Moscow's offensive in Ukraine.
People walk past a branch of Russian VTB bank in Moscow on April 5, 2023. Alexander Nemenov/AFP/Getty Images

While U.S. sanctions have so far failed to cripple the Russian economy, the United States still has an array of more comprehensive sanctions actions it can take, Columbia University’s Edward Fishman wrote for CFR in December, including closing gaps that allow Moscow to access hard currency. Pursuing these economic levers would ratchet up pressure on Russia to end the war in Ukraine.

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What are other governments doing?

The United States implemented these sanctions in tandem with the European Union (EU) and other partners. While the EU placed its own sanctions on Russian banks and individuals, including Putin, the bloc’s sanctions on Russian energy have proven the most contentious. 

At the time of the invasion, Europe was Russia’s largest energy export market. Moscow was supplying nearly 40 percent of the natural gas consumed by the EU and nearly one-third of the bloc’s crude oil. Given that dependence and opposition from Hungary and other members, the EU has not imposed bloc-wide restrictions on gas imports. However, in 2022, the EU announced an embargo on imports of most Russian crude oil and joined the G7 price cap; in early 2023, it imposed an additional ban on Russian refined oil products such as diesel and gasoline. The EU pledged in 2025 to fully end imports of Russian gas by the end of 2027.

The EU and other governments have also imposed sanctions targeting Russia’s financial channels and military technology. Indeed, two-thirds of the more than $330 billion in frozen Russian central bank assets are located in the EU, mostly in Belgium; U.S. and European lawmakers have repeatedly called for using seized Russian central bank reserves to finance Ukraine’s reconstruction. In December 2022, the bloc agreed to ban exports of some military hardware to Russia and its allies, such as Iran. Meanwhile, Taiwan, the world’s leading producer of semiconductors, restricted exports of computing chips, which can be used in drones and other military equipment, to Russia. 

But some countries have taken little to no action against Russia or have otherwise seized on the moment to their own benefit. China and India, for instance, have increased their imports of Russian oil and natural gas. Others have acted as middlemen, importing Western goods and then sending them on to Russia.

Are sanctions working?

Sanctions have inflicted some pain on Russia’s economy, with oil and gas revenue declining after the December 2022 price cap was implemented and Russian central bank assets at risk of confiscation. But those sanctions have not caused widespread economic collapse or halted Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In fact, the International Monetary Fund estimated that Russia’s gross domestic product actually increased by 3.6 percent in 2024—a higher growth rate than the United States and many other Western economies—due to massive war spending. 

Still, some sanctions supporters say the measures are not exclusively designed to crush Russia’s economy or end the war, but to send the message that violating international norms and invading a neighbor will be met with a strong coalition response. They point out that sanctions have still caused disruptions, noting shortages of critical goods such as medicine and airplane parts. Other proponents argue that the penalties will be increasingly effective over time, forcing Russia to make costly trade-offs. 

Analysts say Russia is a particularly difficult target given its export of many crucial commodities, including oil and gas, fertilizers, wheat, and precious metals. At times, Russia has wielded its status as an energy exporter to retaliate against Europe. In August 2022, Moscow shut down the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, which supplied almost 60 percent of Germany’s natural gas. It has also effectively adapted to the new sanctions regimes. Russia soon found ways around the G7 price cap, including by enlisting a “shadow fleet” of oil tankers and shifting exports to China and India. Meanwhile, many European countries continue to import Russian gas, which is more expensive than crude oil.

Prior to its 2022 invasion, Russia spent years building up more than $640 billion in central bank reserves, only half of which are now subject to Western sanctions. Moscow has also adjusted to conduct much of its bilateral trade in rubles and raised interest rates to stabilize its currency to roughly its pre-invasion level.

Trade with China has grown significantly. In 2023, China imported record quantities of Russian energy, and about 92 percent of trade between the two countries is now conducted in rubles and Chinese yuan, according to Russian officials, compared to 25 percent before the invasion. Beijing has also stepped in to supply Moscow with semiconductors and other technologies that could have military uses.

Are new sanctions on the table during ceasefire negotiations?

Trump made ending the Russia-Ukraine war a major campaign pledge, and since returning to office in January, his administration has pushed for a ceasefire and peace negotiations. Since April, Trump has repeatedly threatened to impose further sanctions on Russia if it does not agree to a temporary ceasefire ahead of peace talks. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced in May that the EU was also prepared to impose further sanctions on Russia’s energy and financial sectors in order to draw the country to the negotiating table. 

Russian and Ukrainian delegations met in Istanbul in May for their first direct peace talks since the early days of the war, a culmination of months of pressure by the Trump administration. However, Putin, Trump, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy did not attend the talks, which failed to produce a major breakthrough. Nevertheless, the United States and its Western allies continue to push for an end to the war.

Ivana Saric, Noah Berman, and Anshu Siripurapu contributed to this In Brief. Will Merrow created the graphics.

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Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Sign up to receive CFR President Mike Froman’s analysis on the most important foreign policy story of the week, delivered to your inbox every Friday afternoon. Subscribe to The World This Week. In the Middle East, Israel and Iran are engaged in what could be the most consequential conflict in the region since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. CFR’s experts continue to cover all aspects of the evolving conflict on CFR.org. While the situation evolves, including the potential for direct U.S. involvement, it is worth touching on another recent development in the region which could have far-reaching consequences: the diffusion of cutting-edge U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) technology to leading Gulf powers. The defining feature of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy is his willingness to question and, in many cases, reject the prevailing consensus on matters ranging from European security to trade. His approach to AI policy is no exception. Less than six months into his second term, Trump is set to fundamentally rewrite the United States’ international AI strategy in ways that could influence the balance of global power for decades to come. In February, at the Artificial Intelligence Action Summit in Paris, Vice President JD Vance delivered a rousing speech at the Grand Palais, and made it clear that the Trump administration planned to abandon the Biden administration’s safety-centric approach to AI governance in favor of a laissez-faire regulatory regime. “The AI future is not going to be won by hand-wringing about safety,” Vance said. “It will be won by building—from reliable power plants to the manufacturing facilities that can produce the chips of the future.” And as Trump’s AI czar David Sacks put it, “Washington wants to control things, the bureaucracy wants to control things. That’s not a winning formula for technology development. We’ve got to let the private sector cook.” The accelerationist thrust of Vance and Sacks’s remarks is manifesting on a global scale. Last month, during Trump’s tour of the Middle East, the United States announced a series of deals to permit the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia to import huge quantities (potentially over one million units) of advanced AI chips to be housed in massive new data centers that will serve U.S. and Gulf AI firms that are training and operating cutting-edge models. These imports were made possible by the Trump administration’s decision to scrap a Biden administration executive order that capped chip exports to geopolitical swing states in the Gulf and beyond, and which represents the most significant proliferation of AI capabilities outside the United States and China to date. The recipe for building and operating cutting-edge AI models has a few key raw ingredients: training data, algorithms (the governing logic of AI models like ChatGPT), advanced chips like Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) or Tensor Processing Units (TPUs)—and massive, power-hungry data centers filled with advanced chips.  Today, the United States maintains a monopoly of only one of these inputs: advanced semiconductors, and more specifically, the design of advanced semiconductors—a field in which U.S. tech giants like Nvidia and AMD, remain far ahead of their global competitors. To weaponize this chokepoint, the first Trump administration and the Biden administration placed a series of ever-stricter export controls on the sale of advanced U.S.-designed AI chips to countries of concern, including China.  The semiconductor export control regime culminated in the final days of the Biden administration with the rollout of the Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion, more commonly known as the AI diffusion rule—a comprehensive global framework for limiting the proliferation of advanced semiconductors. The rule sorted the world into three camps. Tier 1 countries, including core U.S. allies such as Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, were exempt from restrictions, whereas tier 3 countries, such as Russia, China, and Iran, were subject to the extremely stringent controls. The core controversy of the diffusion rule stemmed from the tier 2 bucket, which included some 150 countries including India, Mexico, Israel, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Many tier 2 states, particularly Gulf powers with deep economic and military ties to the United States, were furious.  The rule wasn’t just a matter of how many chips could be imported and by whom. It refashioned how the United States could steer the distribution of computing resources, including the regulation and real-time monitoring of their deployment abroad and the terms by which the technologies can be shared with third parties. Proponents of the restrictions pointed to the need to limit geopolitical swing states’ access to leading AI capabilities and to prevent Chinese, Russian, and other adversarial actors from accessing powerful AI chips by contracting cloud service providers in these swing states.  However, critics of the rule, including leading AI model developers and cloud service providers, claimed that the constraints would stifle U.S. innovation and incentivize tier 2 countries to adopt Chinese AI infrastructure. Moreover, critics argued that with domestic capital expenditures on AI development and infrastructure running into the hundreds of billions of dollars in 2025 alone, fresh capital and scale-up opportunities in the Gulf and beyond represented the most viable option for expanding the U.S. AI ecosystem. This hypothesis is about to be tested in real time. In May, the Trump administration killed the diffusion rule, days before it would have been set into motion, in part to facilitate the export of these cutting-edge chips abroad to the Gulf powers. This represents a fundamental pivot for AI policy, but potentially also in the logic of U.S. grand strategy vis-à-vis China. The most recent era of great power competition, the Cold War, was fundamentally bipolar and the United States leaned heavily on the principle of non-proliferation, particularly in the nuclear domain, to limit the possibility of new entrants. We are now playing by a new set of rules where the diffusion of U.S. technology—and an effort to box out Chinese technology—is of paramount importance. Perhaps maintaining and expanding the United States’ global market share in key AI chokepoint technologies will deny China the scale it needs to outcompete the United States—but it also introduces the risk of U.S. chips falling into the wrong hands via transhipment, smuggling, and other means, or being co-opted by authoritarian regimes for malign purposes.  Such risks are not illusory: there is already ample evidence of Chinese firms using shell entities to access leading-edge U.S. chips through cloud service providers in Southeast Asia. And Chinese firms, including Huawei, were important vendors for leading Gulf AI firms, including the UAE’s G-42, until the U.S. government forced the firm to divest its Chinese hardware as a condition for receiving a strategic investment from Microsoft in 2024. In the United States, the ability to build new data centers is severely constrained by complex permitting processes and limited capacity to bring new power to the grid. What the Gulf countries lack in terms of semiconductor prowess and AI talent, they make up for with abundant capital, energy, and accommodating regulations. The Gulf countries are well-positioned for massive AI infrastructure buildouts. The question is simply, using whose technology—American or Chinese—and on what terms? In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it will be American technology for now. The question remains whether the diffusion of the most powerful dual-use technologies of our day will bind foreign users to the United States and what impact it will have on the global balance of power.  We welcome your feedback on this column. Let me know what foreign policy issues you’d like me to address next by replying to president@cfr.org.

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